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Abstract—True random number generators (TRNGs) are sig-
nificant piece of hardware security that are used to generate
secret keys, initial values or random masks for counter measures
against side-channel attacks. Thus the security of implementation
in hardware of such block is crucial. The work presented in this
paper show that it is possible to find information on a TRNG
using its electromagnetic radiations. The proposed analysis is
suitable to retrieve information on the localization, oscillator
frequency and sampling frequency of the TRNG.
Index Terms—Ring Oscillator, TRNG, EM radiation analysis,
Passive attack, Near-field
I. INTRODUCTION
Side channel attacks (SCA) are one of the major threat to
hardware cryptographic systems. When an attacker is targeting
a cipher to retrieve the secret key, she could perform a global
attack using power analysis (PA - [1]) or electromagnetic
analysis (EMA - [2]). However, these global attacks are
ineffective in the presence of countermeasures that make the
key not correlated with the global leakage of the chip. On
the other hand, these countermeasures are not efficient if the
measurement of the side channel is done locally. For example,
this local measurement could be done by probing directly the
chip, but this measurement is highly invasive. Using the near-
field EM radiation of the chip to perform such local attack
gives good results without opening the package of the device.
It also permits at the same time, to build a map of the elements
composing the chip ([3],[4]).
Our target in this paper will be true random number
generators (TRNGs). TRNGs are essential in cryptography
systems. They are used to generate random bitstream, that can
be used, for instance, as confidential keys, random masks for
countermeasures against SCA. Thus, the security of TRNGs
is crucial.
In this paper we are proposing an attack that use the near-
field EM radiation analysis of a circuit that embeds a Ring
Oscillator-TRNG (RO-TRNG). The analysis is based on the
study and comparison of the frequency spectrum of the EM
radiations at different working conditions (e. g. power supply
voltage, temperature). The results show that the proposed
analysis of the device EM radiations can be used efficiently
to retrieve crucial information on the TRNG. This information
can be later used to help performing active attack on the TRNG
such as the attack presented in [5].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
test bench and the TRNG used. In section III, the proposed EM
differential frequency analysis is detailed. Finally, Section IV
provides experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness
of the EM differential frequency analysis.
II. CASE STUDY
A. RO-TRNG
A jittery clock generated by a RO is the most common
type of source of randomness used in TRNGs. ROs are easy
to implement in both ASICs and FPGAs. Figure 1 presents
one of the most common TRNG principles employing several
ROs. One of such TRNG was proposed in [6] and enhanced
in [7]. It needs only inverters (for implementing ROs), flip-
flops (as samplers) and a large XOR gate (entropy collector).
In [6], authors proposed a mathematical model of the TRNG
that guarantees enough entropy in the output bit and thus the
robustness and security. This kind of generator is widely use
in industrial application.
The generator has several parameters that can be tuned:
number of inverters composing ROs, number of ROs and the
sampling frequency. Modifying these parameters, the designer
can change the statistical properties of the random bitstream
produced by the TRNG. For example, according to [7], for a
sampling frequency of 100 MHz, the generator composed of
25 ROs, each using 3 inverters, generates the bitstream passing
common statistical tests even without post-processing.
Fig. 1. RO-TRNG.
B. Test Bench
The EM radiation of the device is evaluated using a near-
field (∼≤ 23mm) EM analysis test bench from Fig. 2. The
most important part of the test bench is the acquisition chain.
It determines the signal to noise ratio and precision of the
measurement. It is composed of:
• A Rhode and Schwarz magnetic probe with the frequency
range from 100 kHz to 3 GHz and the spatial resolution
of approx. 500 µm.
• A Miteq low-noise amplifier with the frequency range
from 100 MHz to 2 GHz.
• A Lecroy oscilloscope with the frequency range up to 3.5
GHz.
The device under test (the board) is fixed on a XYZ table
with repeatability of movement of 1 µm. The test bench,
including acquisition chain, XYZ table, FPGA configuration
and power supply variations, is controlled by a PC. Note that,
compared to typical EM compatibility analysis, we did not
need to use a faraday cage to protect the measurement chain
from EM interference.
Fig. 2. EM analysis test bench
III. EM ANALYSIS APPLIED TO A RO-TRNG
A. Frequency Analysis
Fig. 3. EM cartography using frequency analysis
The goal of the passive attack is to retrieve as much infor-
mation as possible on the cryptographic system and namely
on the TRNG. When using RO-TRNG, we suppose that the
attacker will tend to determine the working frequencies of the
ROs, their locations on the chip, and if possible, the sampling
frequency of the flip-flops. To extract such an information from
the EM radiations, we have used a so-called EM cartography
method presented in Fig. 3. In this method, the EM radiations
of the device are analyzed point by point using a frequency
analysis [3]. The aim of the EM cartography is to obtain an EM
map of the device at certain frequency (e. g. see two maps on
the left side of Fig. 3, one obtained at 100 MHz and the second
one at 250 MHz). For each point (i, j), an electromagnetic
trace is acquired and the power spectral density (PSD) of
this trace denoted |Y {i, j}(f)| is computed using Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT). Figure 4 presents a typical PSD of the EM
radiation of a cryptographic circuit including a RO-TRNG
embedded in an FPGA. Notice that it is not possible to directly
guess the ROs working frequencies. Indeed, the RO-TRNG
represents a small part of the cryptographic system and its
contribution to the EM radiation is insignificant compared to
the contribution of large synchronous blocks such as cipher. As
a consequence, the attacker will need to discern the frequency
contributions of the ROs from those of the other modules in
the PSD.
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B. Differential Frequency Analysis
It is commonly known that the RO frequency depends
dynamically on the power supply voltage and temperature. In
synchronous systems clocked by an external quartz oscillator
(most of today’s systems), the frequency of RO is more
sensitive to environmental variations than that of the system
clock. This RO characteristic can be used to discern ROs fre-
quency contributions in the PSD by performing a differential
frequency analysis. This analysis consists in performing two
successive EM frequency analyses for two distinct working
conditions {Cond #1, Cond #2} (e. i. two distinct power
supply voltages or two distinct temperatures). A differential
EM radiation PSD is computed by subtracting the two PSD
at Cond #1 and Cond #2. This differential PSD is expected
to contain two symmetrical spectral contributions with large
frequency shifting, which highlights the presence of condition-
sensitive block such as RO in the targeted chip. Final EM
device maps at Cond #1 and Cond #2 permit to detect the
presence of ROs and determine its location and frequency.
C. Experiments
We realized three experiments:
• The first two experiments should show that the proposed
method is suitable to detect a RO-TRNG, while an AES
(using a 20MHz clock) is running in the same device
(one RO-TRNG in the upper left corner in Experiment
#1 and one in the lower right corner in Experiment #2,
as shown in Fig. 5).
• The third experiment aim at proving that it is possible to
find the sampling frequency of the RO-TRNG. It consists
of using design of experiment#2 and doing measurement
for two different sampling frequencies.
We have implemented the two designs in the Microsemi
Fusion AFS600 FPGA device. The TRNG was built using
50 ROs, each composed of 3 inverters. For the first two
experiments the sampling frequency was 6.9 MHz. For the
third one we used two sampling frequencies: 6.9 MHz and
8.9 MHz. We recall that the EM analysis is not invasive and
so the FPGA package could remain intact.
Fig. 5. From left to right floorplan of: Experiment #1and Experiment #2
We decided to perform the EM cartography of the whole
FPGA package (1.7 cm x 1.7 cm). In order to get a sufficient
resolution and to have a reasonable amount of points, we have
chosen a resolution of 90x90 points (∼ 200 µm resolution).
For each point of the EM device map, 10 traces of 200 000
points (with a sampling rate of 20 Gsa/s) were acquired and
then averaged. In order to simplify the analysis (obtention of
the RO’s frequency range), the points were gathered in 9 larger
”areas” (30x30), for which the PSDs are averaged. Note that
for localizing ROs, the map resolution remains unchanged.
As stated previously, in the differential frequency analysis,
the attacker needs to obtain two EM device maps at different
voltage or temperature conditions. It is important to note that
the working conditions (voltage or temperature) must remain
sufficiently stable during the construction of each of two EM
device maps. We decided to modify the power supply voltage
of the device because it was more accurate than varying
temperature. The EM device maps are performed at 1.5 V
and 1.7 V for the Experiment #1 and #2.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Results of Experiment #1 and #2: RO frequency and
localization retrieval
The PSDs of the first two experiments are depicted in Fig. 6
and Fig. 7. We recall that the aim of the first two experiments
was to show that it is possible to find the position and
frequencies of the ROs composing a RO-TRNG while an AES
is running in the same device. In section III.B we expected that
only the frequencies corresponding to the ROs would clearly
appear in the differential PSDs. As it can be seen in Fig. 6
and Fig. 7, other frequencies are not completely suppressed by
the differential frequency analysis. This is mainly due to the
fact that, for a given system frequency, the amplitude of this
frequency in the PSD varies slightly from one measurement
to another. Nevertheless, this effect remains negligible and the
proposed method remains very useful for locating frequencies
of interest in the PSDs.
In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, the positive part of the differential
PSDs corresponds to the EM device map at 1.5 V and the
negative part to the EM device map at 1.7 V.
For Experiment #1 (see Fig. 6):
• For 1.5 V, ROs frequencies range from 331 to 354 MHz.
• For 1.7 V, ROs frequencies range from 376 to 399 MHz.
From Fig. 6, we can expect that the RO-TRNG radiation will
be visible in the upper left corner of the DIE only for the
couple of conditions (1.5 V and f = [331 MHz - 354 MHz])
and (1.7 V and f = [376 MHz-399 MHz]).
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Fig. 6. Differential PSD of the Experiment #1 at the center of the chip
For Experiment #2 (see Fig. 7):
• For 1.5 V, ROs frequencies range from 327 to 347 MHz.
• For 1.7 V, ROs frequencies range from 374 to 394 MHz.
From Fig. 7, we can expect that the RO-TRNG radiation will
be visible in the bottom right corner of the DIE only for the
couple of conditions (1.5 V and f = [327 MHz - 347 MHz])
and (1.7 V and f = [374 MHz-394 MHz]).
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Fig. 7. Differential PSD of the Experiment #2 at the center of the chip
Figure 8 and Fig. 9 show EM device maps of Experiment
#1 and #2 for the two power supply voltage conditions (1.5 V
and 1.7 V). The white dotted rectangle represents the FPGA’s
DIE and the solid rectangle represents the location of the
ROs. These EM device maps are plotted for the frequencies
ranges obtained by the differential frequency analysis. We can
conclude that we are able to locate the RO-TRNG on the chip
by finding the RO’s working frequencies. Plus we can note that
the activity of the AES block inside the FPGA has no influence
on the result of the EM differential frequency analysis.
Fig. 8. EM device maps for the Experiment #1
Fig. 9. EM device maps for the Experiment #2
B. Results of Experiment #3: Sampling frequency retrieval
The aim of this experiment is to retrieve the sampling
frequency of the RO-TRNG. The figure Fig. 10 depicts the
differential PSD for the whole circuit (all the PSDs were
averaged) between a measurement for a sampling frequency of
8.9 MHz (positive part of Fig. 10) and a measurement at 6.9
MHz (negative part). It is then easy to find out the sampling
frequency of the RO-TRNG, in fact the attacker just has to find
frequency peaks that will be repeated, with the same spacing,
all over the PSD trace. Thus, the sampling frequency will be
this spacing.
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Fig. 10. Differential PSD of the Experiment #3 for the whole circuit
V. CONCLUSION
Using our EM differential analysis of the frequency we
were able to find the localization of a RO-TRNG in an
FPGA package while running a complete crypto-system in
it. The proposed analysis is also suitable to determine the RO
frequency and the sampling frequency of the TRNG, that could
be helpful to tune an active attack later on. As proposed in the
paper, our analysis requires a small modification of the power
line of the board, since we need to modify the voltage of the
FPGA core, but this analysis could be completely non invasive
if the attacker, for instance, has the possibility to precisely
heat up the device and maintaining the temperature during the
whole acquisition.
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